Wittgenstein&ianism

A brief observation about Wolfgang Künne's "Wittgenstein and Frege's Logical Investigations" in Wittgenstein and Analytic Philosophy. Essays for P. M. S. Hacker. Hans-Johann Glock & John Hyman ed.; Oxford 2009, p. 26-62.

In chapter 2 of his essay, Professor Künne describes one of Frege's objections to the first section of the Tractatus noticing that if things are parts of facts, then things also have to be parts of the world. He says:

"If objects are constituents (Bestandteile) of states of affairs and (obtaining) states of affairs are in turn constituents of facts, as we are told in the Tractatus (2, 2.01, 4.2211) then objects are bound to be constituents of facts, and every constituent of an object has to be a constituent of every fact about that object. ... And, as Frege noticed, it makes for a problem for Tractatus, 1.1, 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things': if facts are composed of things then the world cannot consist of facts without consisting of things."

Künne goes on to report a later reaction Wittgenstein's to this criticism that isn´t really a reply. But he concedes that a the time of Frege's writing the criticism seemed silly to him.

Künne's article is very valuable and I appreciate it highly. But concerning the present question, it seems to me that he is being uncharitable with Wittgenstein's position. I have not done any further reading, but a natural reaction seems to be simply that Wittgenstein does not deny that facts consist of objects (being linked together in states of affairs) but only that objects -without further ado- constitute the world. Objects alone don't constitute anything (see e.g. TLP 2.0122). The world is constituted by facts - which of course, in order to be facts, need that there are objects.

I can think of no argument to the contrary. It seems rather odd that Frege shouldn´t have seen that this was what Wittgenstein says. I also don´t understand why Professor Künne shouldn't admit that this is the natural answer to Frege's objection. Or did he think it too obvious? Then why would he say "Frege's argument... goes through"?

And it seems further odd that Wittgenstein, later on, should not have given exactly that reply to Frege´s criticism. It would seem to me, for that reason, that what Wittgenstein had to say later on struck a very different aspect of the question.