# EN 0004
KRIPKE'S FREGE
General remarks
What Kripke (2001) has to say about Frege in "Frege’s Theory of Sense and Reference:
Some Exegetical Notes", included in Kripke (2011, 254-291; Oxford: University Press) Philosophical Troubles, Collected Papers Volume I is extremely interesting, because it is one way to view Frege and his work under a very radical version of analytical philosophy - which I believe Kripke himself disowns, but which is the basis for his own critical approach to its problems. It is a very extreme view, and it will therefore help me, or so I hope, to make several points about Frege that many philosophers who include comments about Frege in their work get frequently rather very wrong, mainly, because Frege is not really easy to fit into the common analytical paradigm. Since many philosophers tacitly assume that Frege is essentially (maybe the first) analytical philosopher, the trouble to get him into that box is considerable, and can't be achieved without some serious cutting and squeezing of the corpus of his work. Kripke, it would appear, is one of the most radical thinkers when it comes to make fit Frege in the analytical paradigm - hence the value of his observations for my present purpose.
It will take me quite some time to finish this series of very brief remarks. I hope you'll bear with me.
My personal reflections about Wittgenstein, Wittgensteinianism and the various attempts at a constructive philosophy in the wake of his teachings.
No comments:
Post a Comment